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Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide
information theoretically secure key exchange
even in the era of quantum computer [1–3]. How-
ever, QKD requires the classical channel to be
authenticated, and the current method is pre-
sharing symmetric keys [4]. For a QKD network
of n users, this method requires C2
n
= n(n − 1)/2
pairs of symmetric keys to realize pairwise inter-
connection. In contrast, with the help of ma-
ture public key infrastructure (PKI) and post-
quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum re-
sistant security, each user only needs to apply
for a digital certificate from certificate authority
(CA) to achieve efficient and secure authentica-
tion for QKD. We only need to assume the short-
term security of the PQC algorithm to achieve
the long-term security of the distributed keys.
Here, we experimentally verified the feasibility,
efficiency and stability of the PQC algorithm in
QKD authentication, and demonstrated the ad-
vantages when new users join the QKD network.
Using PQC authentication we only need to be-
lieve the CA is safe, rather than all trusted re-
lays. QKD combined with PQC authentication
will greatly promote and extend the application
prospects of quantum safe communication.
Recently, Google claimed to have achieved quantum
supremacy [5], a major milestone towards the develop-
ment of quantum computers. Quantum computing can
efficiently solve classical hard problems such as integer
factorization and discrete logarithms and demonstrates
its quadratic speedup (over classical algorithms) in solv-
ing unstructured search problems [6, 7], which poses a
serious threat to the security of classical cryptographic
algorithms based on the complexity of these problems.
Boudot et al. [8] recently announced the factoring of
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RSA-240, a RSA number of 240 decimal digits or 795 bits,
as well as solved a discrete logarithm of the same size.
New records of this type are constantly being refreshed
as the performance of computer hardware increases over
time. In the era of quantum computing, there are two
kinds of reliable information security mechanisms: one is
quantum cryptography [9], which mainly includes quan-
tum key distribution; the other is post-quantum cryptog-
raphy, such as lattice-based cryptography and code-based
cryptography, which cannot be effectively cracked by the
currently known quantum computing algorithms.
Quantum key distribution is unconditionally secure
based on the principle of quantum mechanics. With re-
alistic devices, the security of QKD can also be guaran-
teed [10]. The experiments and practical applications of
QKD have drastically developed. The secure key rate
reaches 26.2 Mbps at a channel loss of 4 dB (equivalent
to a 20-km-long optical fiber) [11], and the maximum key
distribution distance through practical optical fiber has
exceeded 500 km [12, 13]. Micius satellite has realized
entanglement-based repeaterless quantum key distribu-
tion between two places on the ground at a distance of
1120 km [14]. Through trusted relay, several quantum
communication networks have been built [15–20], and
the “Beijing-Shanghai backbone” quantum communica-
tion network spans 2200 km.
Nowadays, the hardness of most public key cryptogra-
phy are based on integer factorization and discrete loga-
rithm problems that are difficult or intractable for con-
ventional computers. However, Shor’s [6] quantum al-
gorithm can achieve an exponential speedup in solving
these mathematical problems. In 2016, NIST published
a report on Post-quantum Cryptography [21] anticipat-
ing that a quantum computer is likely to be built by
2030 that breaks 2000-bit RSA in a few hours, and there-
fore renders the current public-key infrastructure inse-
cure. As a result, in the same year NIST initiated the
“Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization” process
by announcing a call for proposals of quantum resistant
2cryptographic primitives including public key encryption,
digital signature and key exchange algorithms. And the
process is expected to release the standardization docu-
ments by 2024.
Quantum key distribution includes the quantum chan-
nel that transmit photons and the classical channel used
in post data processing. The unconditional security of
QKD does not require the classical channel to be con-
fidential, but requires it to be authenticated, otherwise
there will be a man-in-the-middle attack. Combined with
the intercept-resend attack, the attacker can completely
obtain the keys of both parties without being discovered,
as shown in Fig. 1a.
The processes of QKD that requires authentication in-
cludes: basis sifting, error correction verification, random
number transfer needed for privacy amplification, and fi-
nal key verification [4]. QKD requires two-way authenti-
cation between the two parties.
The current secure authentication method is to pre-
share a small amount of symmetric seed keys and en-
crypt (sign) and decrypt (verify) the hash value of clas-
sical messages, as shown in Fig. 1b. Later, the generated
quantum key can be used for authentication. This way
can guarantee the information theoretical security, how-
ever when the number of QKD network users is large,
this method is not easy to operate and has the following
problems. On the one hand, for a network with arbitrary
two users connected, if the number of users is n, then the
number of pre-shared key pairs m is
m = C2
n
=
n(n− 1)
2
. (1)
Symmetric keys are generally pre-shared by face-to-face.
When the number of users is relatively large, the burden
of pre-sharing keys is heavy and inefficient. For exam-
ple, if n=100, then m=4950. At the same time, each
user needs to store the authentication key pairs with all
other users. The storage, synchronization and manage-
ment of so many key pairs will increase the complexity
and security risk of the network. One solution is to use a
trusted relay to form a star-type network, each user only
connects and pre-shares one key pair with the trusted re-
lay [18, 22], but this reduces the interconnection between
users. Moreover, when new users join a QKD network,
they need to pre-share symmetric keys with the trusted
relay or the original users on demand. If the new user’s
QKD task is urgent, it may be too late to distribute the
authentication key pairs.
Another type of secure authentication method is using
the post-quantum public key algorithm and PKI [23], as
shown in Fig. 1b, c. Each user gets a digital certificate
signed by a trusted certification center, which contains
his/her identity, public key and other items required by
the PKI standard. For a network of n users, the num-
ber of digital certificates issued is n. If a new user joins
the QKD network, he/she only needs to obtain a dig-
ital certificate. Therefore, the authentication based on
the public key algorithm can solve the problems of pre-
sharing symmetric keys. As long as the PQC algorithm
TABLE I. Key rates and QBERs of the QKD all-pass network
authenticated by PQC algorithm.
Connection Length (km) Loss (dB) Key rate (kbps) QBER
(a) Ring network
U1-U2 50 11.26 72.16 0.751%
U2-U3 70 15.35 20.17 1.140%
U3-U4 90 18.81 10.52 0.883%
U4-U1 70 15.4 30.58 0.647%
(b) Cross network
U1-U2 50 11.21 68.65 0.779%
U2-U4 80 16.31 19.45 1.014%
U4-U3 90 18.46 9.71 0.786%
U3-U1 60 12.15 76.82 0.517%
is secure during the authentication process, the security
of QKD will not be affected, even if the PQC is cracked
after authentication, so we only need to assume the short-
term security of PQC. This is different from using PQC
algorithm for confidentiality or key distribution, which
will require long-term security of the PQC algorithm.
Here, we verifies the application of PQC in QKD au-
thentication, which greatly improves the operability and
efficiency of QKD authentication process.
We realized the application of PQC in the QKD point-
to-point link, with fiber distances from 10 km to 100 km.
Figure 2 shows the key rates as a function of fiber length.
It can be seen that the key rates decrease exponentially
with fiber length, which is in consistent with the the-
oretical expectation. We compared the key rates at the
same fiber length using the pre-shared key authentication
and the post-quantum algorithm authentication, and the
two were consistent within the statistical error. This is
because the execution time of post-quantum algorithm
authentication is less than 1 ms (see Methods), far less
than one authentication cycle of the QKD system, which
is 1s. In the experiment, we also deliberately set PQC to
feedback that the authentication failed, and as a result,
the QKD system will discard the keys for these periods.
QKD networks can be generally divided into two types:
all-pass network and trusted relay network. For the all-
pass network, users are connected by optical switches
(OS). In order to achieve arbitrary connection between
users, each user must have a QKD transmitter and a re-
ceiver. We built an all-pass network for four users, con-
nected by an optical switch, as shown in Fig. 3a. It can
realize two typical topological relationships, one is ring
connection and the other is cross connection, as shown in
Fig. 3b and Fig. 3c respectively. We verified the applica-
tion of PQC authentication in these two kinds of all-pass
networks. The experimental results are shown in Table I.
We note that because the performance of different QKD
devices are not exactly the same, their key rates and
QBERs will be different under the same fiber lengths. Us-
ing PQC authentication, we also demonstrated the QKD
relay network (see Supplementary Fig. 1 and Tabel I).
The above results verify the feasibility of PQC al-
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FIG. 1. Schematic of man-in-the-middle attack and flow diagram of post-quantum cryptography authentication.
a, As a middleman, Eve pretends to be a legitimate party. He cuts off the quantum channel, reconnects the legitimate parties
respectively, and carries out the intercept-resend attack. b, |ψ〉: quantum signals; M : classical messages; H: hash function, we
used SM3 hash algorithm in the experiment; E: encryption (signature); D: decryption; C: comparison; K: pre-shared symmetric
keys, PB : Bob’s public key, SB: Bob’s private key. The figure shows that Alice authenticates Bob’s identity. In the experiment,
we implemented two-way authentication, that is, Bob also authenticates Alice’s identity. c, D: digest; R: random nonce, we
generate them by Intel chips; C: valid certification; Pr public key of certificate authority; || : concatenate two bit strings ; T :
tag (or signature) of concatenation of R and D; S: private key; P : public key.
gorithm for QKD network authentication. In order to
demonstrate the efficiency of PQC authentication, we
built two trusted relay networks and connected them to
simulate the QKD metropolitan area network. They can
be located on both sides of a city. Each relay network
contains 5 user nodes, and a total of 10 users in the entire
network, as shown in Fig. 3d.
When using pre-shared key authentication, the trusted
relay is usually needed to manage pre-shared keys at the
cost of reducing the interconnection. With PQC authen-
tication, the trusted relay can be replaced with an opti-
cal switch to realize arbitrary interconnection. Each user
only needs one digital certificate for authentication, in-
stead of pre-sharing C210 = 45 pairs of symmetric keys,
as shown in Fig. 3e. The interconnectivity of the QKD
network has been greatly improved. To illustrate this
point, in the experiment, we compared the QKD results
of three pairs of users U1-U3, U5-U6, and U8-U10 in two
cases, as shown in Table II. Moreover, PQC authenti-
cation only needs to assume that the certificate author-
ity is safe, reducing the security dependence on multiple
trusted relays, which can improve the actual security of
the entire network.
In the experiment, two new users U11 and U12 join
the QKD network, as shown in Fig. 3e. If pre-shared key
authentication is used, for the relay network, new users
need to pre-share keys with the relay, and can only per-
form QKD with the relay, but not with other users. For
the all-pass network, each new user needs to pre-share 10
pairs of symmetric keys with 10 original users, and 1 pair
4TABLE II. Comparison of key rates and QBERs between relay network and all-pass network. R1 and R2 stand for realy 1 and
realy 2 in Fig. 3(e), respectively. The fiber length between two users in the all-pass network is the sum of the fiber lengths of
the links between the two users in the relay network.
Connection Length (km) Loss (dB) Key rate (kbps) QBER
(a) Relay network
U1-U3
U1-R1 10 2.69 363.59 0.648%
R1-U3 30 6.70 194.32 0.761%
U5-U6
U5-R1 20 3.99 293.53 0.752%
R1-R2 20 4.08 288.16 0.475%
R2-U6 20 4.11 288.74 0.364%
U8-U10
U8-R2 10 2.62 287.47 0.511%
R2-U10 10 2.66 333.06 0.529%
(b) All-pass network
U1-U3 40 9.02 90.83 0.630%
U5-U6 60 12.12 48.00 0.978%
U8-U10 20 5.23 200.87 0.514%
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FIG. 2. The secure key rate as a function of fiber
length when QKD is authenticated by the PQC al-
gorithm. They are the average values in five minutes. The
error bar represents a standard deviation.
of keys between the two new users. A total of 21 pairs
of keys need to be pre-shared to achieve the connection
between any two users. In contrast, if PQC authenti-
cation is adopted, trusted relays can be replaced with
optical switches. Each new user only needs to apply for
one digital certificate, and a total of two digital certifi-
cates can realize the connection of any two users. This
greatly improves the convenience for new users to access
the network and interconnection. After U11 and U12 got
digital certificates, we demonstrated the QKD between
U11-U2, U11-U7, U12-U4, U12-U9, and U11-U12. The
results are shown in Table III.
Finally, we tested the stability of PQC authentication
with a pair of QKD devices. The fiber length is 40 km,
and it has been running continuously for 30 hours. The
PQC program keeps running normally, and QKD systems
continuously generate keys (see Supplementary informa-
tion).
Summarizing, We used the lattice-based post-quantum
TABLE III. QKD Key rates and QBERs between new users
U11 and U12 and original users in the network, and between
U11 and U12.
Connection Length (km) Loss (dB) Key rate (kbps) QBER
U11-U2 40 8.11 139.79 0.846%
U11-U7 50 11.26 90.18 0.573%
U12-U4 40 8.11 113.42 0.792%
U12-U9 40 8.16 101.78 0.873%
U11-U12 50 11.07 83.05 0.858%
digital signature algorithm Aigis-Sig, combined with
PKI, to achieve efficient and quantum secure authenti-
cation of QKD. Since the Aigis-Sig algorithm is highly
computationally efficient, it does not affect the perfor-
mance of QKD, such as the key rate. We experimentally
verified the feasibility of its application in metropolitan
QKD relay network and all-pass network. With PQC au-
thentication, the trusted relay in the QKD network can
be replaced with an optical switch. Each user only needs
to apply for a digital certificate through PKI to realize
the direct connection between any two users. When a
new user joins the network, he/she only need to obtain a
digital certificate, instead of distributing symmetric keys
with all other users, and they can immediately establish a
QKD connection. Compared with the pre-shared key au-
thentication, PQC authentication has obvious operabil-
ity and efficiency advantages. Moreover, if the number of
trusted relays is less, the security dependence on trusted
relays in the network can be reduced, thus improving the
security of the entire QKD network. We have also veri-
fied the long-term stability of PQC authentication.
Methods
In the experiment, we used the BB84 protocol com-
bined with decoy state method [24], with polarization
encoding. The system operating frequency was 625 MHz,
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FIG. 3. PQC authentication in QKD networks. a, All-pass QKD network. Four users are connected to each other
through an optical switch. b, Ring network. c, Cross network. The actual distance between any two users is the sum of their
respective distances from the optical switch. d, A 10-node QKD metropolitan area network composed of two relay networks.
e, Trusted relays are replaced with optical switches to form an all-pass network. U11 and U12 are new users. See the text for
the distance from each user to the trusted relay (optical switch).
and single photon detectors based on InGaAs avalanche
photodiodes were used. The QKD transmitter and the
QKD receiver were synchronized by periodic pulsed light.
The synchronous light transmitted with the quantum sig-
nal light via a single optical fiber through wavelength-
division multiplexing. The QKD systems used SM3 hash
algorithm to generate digest values of 256 bits for the
messages to be authenticated, and output them to PQC
program. The finite-key effect is considered in the data
processing.
The PQC algorithm we used is Aigis-Sig [25], an effi-
cient lattice-based digital signature scheme from variants
of Learning With Errors (LWE) [26] and Small Integer
Solutions (SIS) [27] problems. It has been shown that
these two problems are at least as hard as some worst-
case lattice problems (e.g., Gap-SIVP) for certain pa-
rameter choices[28–30]. Therefore, the post-quantum se-
curity of Aigis-Sig algorithm is based on the conjectured
quantum resistance of the underlying lattice problems.
Furthermore, it has not been found that quantum algo-
rithms have substantial advantages (beyond polynomial
speedup) over classical ones in solving lattice problems.
Our authentication protocol adopts a PKI enhanced
with post-quantum secure Aigis-Sig as shown in Fig. 1c.
The protocol consists of two phases. In the first phase,
the transmitter and the receiver first exchange their own
certificates issued by the certificate authority (CA) to
each other. Then they use the public key of CA to verify
the other public key belongs to its identity. In the sec-
ond phase, the transmitter and the receiver first use our
Aigis-Sig to sign the message digest under their own pri-
vate keys, then they use the confirmed public keys of the
other to verify the correctness of the receiving signatures.
Because only the legitimate party has the corresponding
private key, it can be confirmed that the message is signed
legally.
In order to prevent the replay attack, we introduce
the nonce in our authentication protocol, the nonce is a
random number generated by Intel chips. We exchange
the nonce in the first phase and concatenate them with
the message digest together as our signing message in
the second phase. Note that we implemented two-way
authentication in QKD data processing.
We implement PQC algorithm in Win10 64bit, In-
tel(R) Core(TM) i7-9750H CPU @2.60GHz, 8G RAM.
The average CPU cycle of Signature Generation is
459903. The average CPU cycle of Signature Verifica-
tion is 104337. The signature size is 2445 bytes. The
real execution time is less than 1ms.
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Supplementary information
In the relay network experiment, the network includes
a relay node and three user nodes, as shown in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4. The QKD network based on trusted relay, U1-U3
represents three user nodes, all of them hold QKD transmit-
ters, relay node places a QKD receiver. The users generate
key pairs with each other through the relay.
TABLE IV. Key rates and quantum bit error rates (QBERs)
of the QKD relay network authenticated by PQC algorithm.
Connection Length (km) Loss (dB) Key rate (kbps) QBER
relay-U1 20 4.03 309.55 0.704%
relay-U2 30 6.87 226.62 0.381%
relay-U3 40 8.23 109.71 0.742%
Due to the high cost of single photon detectors, relay
nodes generally deploy QKD receivers, and user nodes
deploy QKD transmitters. The fiber lengths between
the relay and the users are typical distances within
metropolitan area. Using PQC authentication, the QKD
between the relay node and the three users was success-
fully achieved. The key rates and QBERs are shown in
the Table IV, they are the average values in five minutes.
In the experiment, we tested the stability of PQC au-
thentication with a pair of QKD devices. The fiber length
is 40 km, and it has been running continuously for 30
hours. The PQC program keeps running normally, and
QKD systems continuously generate keys, as shown in
Fig. 5. The secure key rate is in the range of 100 -
180 kbps, and the fluctuations are caused by the QBER
reaching 3% or the continuous running time reaching 30
minutes, which triggers the polarization feedback set by
the QKD system. The 30-hour average key rate is 144.1
kbps. It can also be seen from the figure that polariza-
tion feedback is more frequent during the daytime (08:00-
18:00) than at night (18:00-08:00), because human activi-
ties and temperature fluctuations during the day interfere
more seriously with the optical fiber. Figure 6 shows a
curve of the QBER within a 30-minute operating cycle of
a QKD system. One QBER data is recorded every sec-
ond. The QBER is distributed between 0.65% and 1.1%,
and the 30-minute average is 0.876%. The above results
show the stability and reliability of PQC authentication
applied to QKD.
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FIG. 5. A curve of 30-hour QKD key rates. The fiber distance
is 40 km, and each value is an average of 5 minutes. The near
periodic fluctuation of the key rate is due to the fact that
the QKD system is set to start polarization feedback when
the QBER reaches 3% or the QKD continuous running time
reaches 30 minutes, so the data points containing polarization
feedback in the key rate statistical period will be lower.
12:50 13:00 13:10
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
Timeh
QB
ER
%
FIG. 6. A curve of QBER for 30 minutes. One data is
recorded per second in the experiment. The average QBER
is 0.876%.
